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INTRODUCTION 
Radio and television have been buzzing with talk about the GATT for years, the papers have been 
filled with articles on the subject and the 'Uruguay Round' was making headlines regularly until 
its completion with the signing of  the Final Act in Marrakesh on 15 April1994. Yet, many people 
do not know what it is all about and what actually lurks behind the household acronym. At the 
very best, the worries that the Uruguay Round have sparked among Europe's farmers have made 
people aware of the fact that the GAIT negotiations involved high stakes for our agriculture. 
What is the GAIT? What are the principles upon which it is founded? What are its aims? What 
rounds of  negotiation has the GAIT weathered since its creation in 1947? What, exactly, did the 
Uruguay Round consist of, especially its important agricultural chapter? What were the various 
steps in this lengthy round and why did it involve a clash between the United States and the 
European Community? Finally,  what are  the  terms of the  agreement that was  reached in 
December 1993 and signed at an official ceremony in Marrakesh four months later? In the next 
few pages we shall try to answer all these questions, then wrap up with some brief comments 
about the GATT's successor, the new World Trade Organization. 
This summary document is intended to explain the general course of  developments that led to the 
Uruguay Round's successful conclusion. This entailed summarizing a complex subject without 
dwelling at length upon the many exceptions to the Agreement's general principles. Readers who 
are keen to examine the specific details are urged to consult the appropriate specialized texts. 
* 
*  * 
··········································---~~-~ 
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I.  The GATT: aims and principles 
GATT stands for 'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade'. This is a 38-article treaty that was 
signed by 23 countries in 194  7 and went into effect in 1948. The number of  signatory states has 
risen steadily since then to stand at 114 in 1994. These 114 countries account for about 90% of 
world trade. 
The GATT's main objective is to liberalize international trade and set it on stable foundations so 
as  to  contribute  to  economic  growth,  development  and  the  well-being  of peoples.  This 
agreement, which was drawn up to ensure the security and predictability of  international trade, is 
the  only  multilateral  instrument that  sets  international  trade  rules  through  a  procedure  of 
international consultation and debate. It offers the Contracting Parties a forum for conducting 
their trade negotiations to a successful conclusion. 
The GATT has a secretariat in Geneva. The role of this secretariat is to monitor national trade 
policies, check that the treaty is implemented properly and arbitrate any disputes that may arise. 
The latter are examined by special arbitration boards called 'panels'. 
The main means of  achieving the increasing liberalization of  world trade is notably a 'substantial 
reduction in customs tariffs and other impediments to trade'. To achieve this, the GATT relies on a 
few basic principles, as follows: 
1.  Most-favoured-nation clause: A concession made by one Contracting Party to another 
Contracting  Party  must be extended to  all  the  others.  Thus,  no country may  give  an 
advantage to or discriminate against any other country. All signatories benefit from the 
advantages that any reduction in impediments to trade may produce. 
2.  National treatment principle: Products imported into a given market may not be treated less 
favourably than similar domestic products. 
3.  Tariffication: All protective measures at the border must be converted into customs duties 
(tariffs). 
4.  Tariff bindings: The 'binding' (setting) of tariff levels that are negotiated between the 
Contracting Parties constitutes a stable basis for trade and thus trade's predictability. 
5.  Prohibition of  quantitative restrictions (quotas): Import quotas are one of  the main barriers 
to international trade. Although they are much less widespread today than in the past, such 
practices continue to hamper trade in various goods, especially agricultural commodities. 
············································-~-~ 
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6.  Antidumpini code: This code sets forth various rules under the GATT to combat unfair 
trade practices such as dumping and export subsidies. ('Dumping' occurs when a product is 
sold on an importing country's market below the price at which it is sold on the producer's 
domestic market.) 
7.  Safeitlard clause: This clauses autaorizes the signatory countries, when their economic or 
trade  situation  justifies  such  action,  to  apply  import  restrictions  or  suspend  tariff 
concessions in the case of products that are imported in such quantities and under such 
conditions that they cause or threaten to cause severe harm to domestic producers. 
~m~•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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II.  The negotiating rounds: a historical overview 
The Contracting Parties have met around the table a number of times since the Agreement's 
signing in 1947 to negotiate the gradual liberalization of  international trade. These discussions, 
which have come to be called 'rounds', and the highlights of  their achievements, especially in the 
field of agriculture, are listed below. 
1.  Geneva (1947) 
Twenty-three countries sign the GATT treaty. 
The tariff reductions that are adopted immediately affect half of world trade right away. 
2.  Annecy (1949) 
Ten more countries join the GATT. 
5,000 additional tariff concessions are adopted. 
3.  Torquay (1951) 
Four new members. 
8,  700 additional tariff  concessions are approved. At this stage, the average reduction 
in tariffs compared with those in effect in 1948 (the year the GATT went into effect) is roughly 
25%. 
4.  Geneva (1956) 
Japan joins the GATT. 
Further drop in tariffs. 
5.  Dillon Round (1960-61) 
4,400 additional tariff concessions. 
The Customs Union and common agricultural policy (CAP) instituted in Europe in the wake 
of the EEC's creation (see boxed text) prompt negotiations within the GATT. 
A 6-7% average reduction in the EEC's Common Customs Tariffs (CCT), including lower 
duties on fruit and vegetables and binding of the zero tariff on oilseeds. 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ••••••••••  liiiJI  ...  '·'·'  ·'<·  . 
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Landmarks 
The Common Aerieultural Polky 
25 March 1957: signing of  the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community (EEC). 
The operation and development of  the common market for agricultural products must be 
accompanied by the establishment of  a common agricultural policy among the Member States.' 
(Article 38) 
'The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be: 
a)  to increase agricultural productivity ........... ; 
b)  thus to ensure a fair standard of  living for the agricultural community  ..... ; 
c)  to stabilize markets; 
d)  to assure the availability of supplies; 
e)  to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.' (Article 39) 
' ... a ~ommon  organization of agricultural markets shall be established.' (Article  40) 
1958: adoption of the basic principles of the common agricultural policy (CAP) at the Stresa 
conference: 
single market (a single agricultural market within which agricultural products circulate freely 
and benefit from stable, guaranteed prices); 
Community preference (preference given to commodities and goods produced inside the 
Community); and 
financial solidarity (Community fmancing of the CAP). 
The principle of  Community preference entailed keeping the prices of  Community products below those 
of  imports onto the European market. This led to the institution of two basic mechanisms of  the CAP: 
import levies (import duties were levied on imported goods that made the latter more expensive 
than comparable domestic products) and 
export refunds (subsidies for exported Community products to make them competitive on world 
markets). 
1962: frrst common market regulations. 
1968: application of common prices. 
1979-88: a number of measures were taken to curb rising production, namely,· 
co-responsibility levies, guarantee thresholds, 
milk quotas, 
the dismantling of the monetary compensatory amounts scheme, 
stabilizers regime, and 
budget discipline. 
1992:  reform of the CAP. 
..  .  ,,  ,.,  .•  ""'  $>'  ill$ ••••  - •  •  •  •  ••••  - •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  - ••••••••••••••••• 
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6.  Kennedy Round (1964-67) 
Average tariff reduction of 35%. 
Creation of the Antidumping Code. 
Institution of a preferential mechanism for developing countries. 
EEC binds 'zero rate' duty to manioc (cassava) and specific cereal substitutes. 
Negotiations on the organization of the major common markets spawned by the CAP, i.e. 
cereals, dairy products and beef. The GATT did not take a stand on the system of  levies (see 
boxed text about the CAP) and their compatibility with the rules of  the General Agreement. 
The refund scheme, for its part, would be applied in accordance with Article XVI of the 
GATT, which stipulates that if  a Contracting Party grants an export subsidy ' ... such subsidy 
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that Contracting Party having more than an 
equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares of 
the Contracting Parties in such trade in the product during  a previous  representative 
period  ... ' (Article XVI, Section B, paragraph 3). 
Wheat arrangement. 
7.  Tokyo Round (1973-79) 
'kl- Participation of 99 countries. 
34% average reduction in duties. All in all, the mean level of  customs duties had dropped 
from 15% at the time of  the GATT's creation to 4.7% at the conclusion of  the Tokyo Round. 
Revision of the Antidumping Code. 
Improvement of the legal framework for international trade. 
Agreement on non-tariff measures (subsidies and compensatory measures, technical 
barriers to trade, public procurement, customs valuation, and import licences). 
Arrangements concerning beef and the dairy sector. 
8.  Uruguay Round (1986-1993) 
The Uruguay Round was the eighth round of multilateral negotiations under GATT since the 
Agreement's creation in 1947. The Uruguay Round opened in Punta del Este (Uruguay) on 20 
September  1986  and ended with an  agreement reached by  117  countries  ( 113  of the  114 
signatories to the GATT plus four observers, including China) in Geneva on 15 December 1995. 
The official signing of this document, called 'The Final Act', took place during the Ministerial 
Conference that was held in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 12-15 April1994. 
The various stages in the Uruguay Round and the basic subjects it covered are outlined in the 
following chapter. 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  m  m  ""·  "''  .,,  ..  ,  .... 
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III.  The Uruguay Round 
A.  The objectives 
The Declaration issued by the 105 trade ministers who met in Punta del Este in September 1986 
consisted of two parts, namely: 
a)  negotiations about trade in goods; and 
b)  negotiations about trade in services. 
Together these two parts cover fifteen negotiating areas, of  which fourteen concern trade in 
goods.  This  is  something  new  compared with  the  previous  rounds,  which  covered 
primarily tariffs. 
The fourteen negotiating areas related to trade in goods are as follows: 
1.  Customs duties 
2.  Non-tariff measures 
3.  Tropical products 
4.  Products derived from natural resources 
5.  Textiles and clothing 
6.  Agriculture 
7.  Articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
8.  Safeguards 
9.  Agreements and arrangements reached by the Tokyo Round 
10.  Subsidies and compensatory measures 
11.  Settlement of disputes 
12.  Intellectual property 
13.  Investment measures 
14.  The GATT's operation 
The general goals are: 
to allow the greater liberalization and expansion of world trade, 
to reinforce the GAIT's role and improve the multilateral trade system, 
to reinforce the cohesion of  trade policies and other economic policies affecting growth 
and development. 
··············································-~--
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Fuller liberalization obviously calls for  further reductions in customs duties, especially the 
highest ones.  Indeed, although many customs duties had been lowered considerably during 
previous rounds, a certain number of developed countries continued to have large numbers of 
'tariff  peaks'. These are rates of 15% or more, the effect of  which is to throttle imports. One of  the 
Uruguay Round's priorities was to cut these duties by at least one third. 
Another barrier to liberalizing world trade is created by non-tariff  measures (already subjected to 
negotiation during the Tokyo Round), including quotas. There, too, one of  the main objectives of 
the Uruguay Round was to reduce, even do away with such measures, if possible. 
B.  Agriculture 
1.  Principles and orientations 
All of  the participants in the September 1986 ministerial meeting in Punta del Este agreed to take 
on the ambitious task of reincorporating agriculture into the GATT. 
The ministers declared there was an urgent need to improve the discipline and predictability of 
world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions, especially those 
linked to structural surpluses, so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability that 
plague world agricultural markets. 
They agreed that the negotiations should strive to liberalize agricultural trade further and have all 
measures  concerning  market  access  for  imports  and  export  competition  governed  by 
'strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines'. 
These orientations were backed up at a subsequent meeting (in Montreal in December 1988) by an 
agreement providing for a gradual, significant reduction in agricultural support and protection 
measures. 
It is possible to pick out from the two main chapters of the negotiations, that is, the internal and 
external chapters, three major topics that remained present throughout the Uruguay Round and 
could be considered the true triple stakes of  seven years of discussion. Agreement thus had to be 
reached on the following three subjects: 
a)  domestic support policies 
b)  export subsidies 
c)  market access. 
In the following pages we shall examine the course of  the negotiations by following the thread of 
proposals that, despite their divergences, all revolved around these three fundamental subjects. 
_,.,,  '-'·  ""  ~ Wf.  •  Ill  lllll  •  •  •  •  •  - ••••  - •••••••  - •  - - •••  - •  - - •••  - - ••••• 
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However, the round was marked right from the start by the head-on clash of two important 
partners. Indeed, efforts to get these partners to see eye to eye occupied centre stage right to the 
conclusion of  the Final Act in December 1993. Their names? The United States of America and 
the European Community. 
2.  The US and European positions 
The starting position of  the United States, which is the country that had called for the launch of  a 
major round of negotiations on agriculture, was to eliminate all agricultural policy measures by 
the year 2000. This 'zero option' position, as it was called, was first taken in July 1987, then 
reasserted in 1989 and, with just slightly more flexibility, in 1990. It  can be described as follows in 
connection with the three major subjects mentioned above: 
a)  an end to all domestic production aid within 10 years (1990 proposal: 75% reduction in 
domestic support); 
b)  an end to all export subsidies within 5 years ( 1990 proposal: 90% reduction in export 
subsidies); 
c)  an end to all protection measures at the border within 10 years. 
This extreme position, which went well beyond the objectives stated in the Punta del Este 
Declaration, got the backing of the  countries  forming  the  Cairns  Group1 but was  rejected 
immediately by the European Community, followed by Japan and the Scandinavian countries. 
The United States and the Cairns Group stuck to their guns, declaring that agreements in the other 
negotiating areas (see page 13) were contingent on an agreement on agriculture. 
The European Community for its part felt that, while the aim of  the negotiations was to reduce 
domestic support, the reduction should not exceed the level required to restore market 
equilibrium. In the Community's opinion, such a reduction had to go hand in hand with a 
parallel drop in export subsidies. The gradual lowering of these two types of support, it 
argued, had to occur in tandem, for if export subsidies were reduced faster, stocks would 
definitely pile up. What is more, given the variety of  support policies in use, the commitments 
to reduce support had to be expressed as reductions in aggregate measurements of support2 
rather than as  specific policies. In a word, the European Community refused to discuss 
separate commitments, but demanded comprehensive negotiations. 
2 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay. 
The aggregate measurement of  support (AMS) is a composite indicator designed to express and 
compare various forms of  support policies that affect production and trade. The AMS is equal to 
the difference between the domestic and world price multiplied by volume of production. 
··········································~~--8·· 
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The Community's position can thus be summed up by the following three points: 
a)  taking aggregate measurements of support into account; 
b)  reducing the AMS for a series of main products (cereals, rice, sugar, oilseeds and animal 
products) by 30% over 10 years starting in 1986; and 
c)  rebalancing external protection by 'tariffication' (the institution of customs duties on imports 
imports of oilseeds and cereal substitutes, which were unprotected products, whereas the 
sectors that were subject to variable duties and charges were well protected). 
The United States and Europe tried to narrow the gap in a compromise, called the 'Hellstrom 
compromise' proposed at the Heysel Conference in Brussels in December 1990. However, their 
respective points of  view proved irreconcilable and the Heysel Conference, which was supposed 
to have wrapped up the Uruguay Round, ended in failure. 
3.  The Dunkel compromise 
On 20 December 1991 Arthur Dunkel, the then Secretary-General of  GATT, presented a 'Draft 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations'. 
When it came to agriculture, this draft final act was actually another attempt at reaching a 
compromise. The broad lines of  this proposal can be summarized as follows: 
a)  a 20% reduction in the AMS compared with their 1986-88 levels (these reductions concerned 
both CAP and US aid, but not income support that was not linked to production); 
b)  a 24% reduction in volume and 36% reduction in budgetary terms in export subsidies 
compared with their 1986-90 levels; 
c)  better market access for imports through a tarification scheme (with a conditional safeguard 
clause), reductions in customs duties of the order of 36%, and a minimum access right of 
5% of the consumer market, taking 1986-90 as the reference period. 
The Dunkel document also contained a text on animal and plant health measures (often used 
improperly for protectionist ends) which defended the principle that all such measures must be 
founded on scientific proof. 
The Community could not accept Mr Dunkel's proposals for the following reasons, broken down 
by the now well-known three major areas of negotiation: 
a)  Domestic support 
While supporting the general idea of the proposal with regard to domestic support, the 
Community could not accept that the measures designed to compensate for losses of 
income that were included in the CAP reform measures then under discussion (see point 4) 
be included among the categories of support due for the axe. 
·.:  ;y,  ;:,,  '*>  W  81  1111  IIIII  fill  IIIII  1111  fill  IIIII  1111  •  fill •••  IIIII ••••  fill  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ••••••••••••••••• 
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b)  Export subsidies 
The Community was willing to make a specific commitment with regard to subsidized 
exports, but deemed the 24% reduction to be too high. 
c)  Market access 
While it is true that the Community could accept the general direction of tarification, the 
Dunkel paper's failure to contain any provisions aimed at restoring market balance (that is 
to say, measures to stabilize the imports of cereal substitutes) was unacceptable. 
In addition, the Community felt it was vital that the utilization of  the CAP's various instruments 
be protected from challenge within the GATT once an agreement on the three negotiating areas 
was  reached.  Mr Dunkel's proposals  did not give  such a  guarantee.  The Community also 
considered it indispensable to settle the dispute over its oilseed support system that had flared up 
in bilateral discussions with the United States (see the boxed text on page 18). 
4.  The CAP reform 
The negotiations had reached a stalemate and the Community was increasingly isolated within 
GATT,  with more and more non-EC countries criticizing its price support policy. This price 
support policy was the result of  the growing imbalances between internal supply and demand for 
a series of products and the build-up of surpluses linked to these imbalances. The various 
measures that had been taken in the 1980s to check this tide (milk quotas, stabilizers, etc.) had 
fallen short of  the mark. Farmers' incomes and consumer demand were down, whereas the budget 
expenditures required for price support were rising. Little by little, the idea that the common 
agricultural policy had to be overhauled if  the Community was to come out of  the impasse gained 
ground. 
For more about this reform, the reader should consult the CAP Working Notes on "The CAP 
Reform and its Implementation". Let us simply recall that the reform adopted in May 1992 rested 
on the following three main pillars: 
a)  lowering agricultural product prices; 
b)  compensating producers for losses of  income due to lower prices through direct payments; and 
c)  controlling production by measures limiting the use of means of production (set-aside 
policy for arable crops, stocking densities for livestock on grazing land). 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••~~w-~ 
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The main advantages of the reform decisions are as follows: 
The considerable cuts in price incentives for intensive production should lead to decreases 
in the volumes produced. The gap between internal EC and world prices should narrow, 
especially for cereals. In the case of oil seeds and protein crops, the internal market prices 
will be completely tied to world market prices. 
The Community's agricultural products will become more competitive compared with 
imports. This is vital when it comes to reliance on cereal substitutes in particular. 
The direct income support scheme makes it possible to take account of  the social problems 
plaguing the agricultural sector and maintain a certain level of production, especially in 
disadvantaged rural areas. 
Together with the social measures that are an integral part of  the reform package, the door is 
open to major environmental and structural improvements in European agriculture. 
Finally, if we look at the reform's impact on external relations, which is of major interest to us 
here, the lower prices and production levels will enable the Community to meet possible commit-
ments in the Uruguay Round's three areas of negotiation, namely, domestic support, market 
access and export competition. The greater competitiveness of  the Community's cereal products, 
for example, may help to stabilize imports of cereal substitutes. 
• ••••w••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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5.  The Blair House Agreement 
Although CAP reform was introduced without waiting for the results of the Uruguay Round, it 
nevertheless changed the thrust of  the negotiations. European farmers' main concern was now to 
obtain the assurance that the direct compensatory payments scheme would not be challenged 
under the GATT. This meant two things: 
a)  the exemption from reducing support that was granted to the aid created under the reformed 
CAP also had to be extended to US deficiency payments (a similar scheme of  direct aid for 
farmers); 
b)  the only commitment that still had to be got from the Community concerned reductions in 
its exports. 
With the goals now clear, discussions were launched between the United States and the European 
Community to hammer out a bilateral agreement as a prelude to a final agreement binding all the 
GATT's  Contracting Parties.  These discussions  culminated in the  Blair House Agreement 
(named after the building in Washington D.C. near the White House where the negotiations took 
place) that was reached on 20 November 1992. 
The substance of the  agreement,  which included commitments covering a  six-year period 
starting in 1995, may be summed up as follows: 
a)  Domestic support 
The two parties agreed to exempt the direct aid paid by the Community under the reformed 
CAP from the commitment to reduce the AMS. This made it possible to compensate the 
Community's farmers for the full amount of  the income lost as a result of  the planned price 
reductions. 
b)  Export competition 
The two parties agreed to cut subsidized export volumes by 21% instead of the 24% set 
forth in the Dunkel compromise. It would thus become possible to meet the commitments 
that  would  derive  from  the  eventual  conclusion  of the  Uruguay  Round  within  the 
framework of the reformed CAP. 
c)  Market access (fairer market share distribution) 
The two parties agreed to launch consultations if  imports of  cereal substitutes rose to such a 
point as to jeopardize the results of the cereal market reform. 
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In addition, the two parties agreed on a text stating that the instruments applied under a country's 
agricultural policy would not be contested on the grounds of GATT Articles XVI and XXIII 
(protection of  concessions and advantages) as long as the disciplines resulting from the Uruguay 
Round in the three areas of  negotiation were fully observed. This came to be known as the 'peace 
clause'. 
Finally, the Blair House Agreement put an end to the oilseeds dispute. The Community would 
henceforward apply the set-aside rate resulting from the Community's yearly decision in this 
respect, based on a  total acreage of 5,128,000 ha,  with the proviso that the set-aside rate 
applicable to oilseed crops would not, however, be less than 10%. 
Contrary to the United States' initial demands, there would not be any additional ceiling on 
oil  seeds expressed in terms of  tonnes of  total production. Under the Blair House Agreement, the 
Community would offer a tariff concession for the import of 500,000 tonnes of maize. The 
production of oilseed crops for non-food uses (such as bioethanol) on land set aside would be 
allowed up to a certain level corresponding to a ceiling on by-products from such crops (one 
million tonnes of meal expressed in soybean meal equivalents, which is the traditional formula 
for calculating the feed value of various oilseeds  ). It thus became possible to put an end to a 
conflict that had plagued the Uruguay Round for four years and, which, in its final phase had 
brought the two partners to the brink of a trade war. 
6.  Compatibility? 
The Blair House Agreement, bilateral and limited in time as it was, was nevertheless objected to 
within the Community itself, notably by France and the associations of producers and agricultural 
co-operatives grouped under COPA/COGECA. Their opposition to the Blair House Agreement can 
be summed up by one key question, namely, was the agreement compatible with CAP reform? 
This was not certain, they argued, notably because the peace clause was not limited in time and the 
agreement did not include any safeguard measures or any specific provisions to restore market 
balance (see point  3). They claimed that any GATT agreement that was based on the Blair House 
Agreement would in the long run weaken external protection and lead to the dismantling of the 
system of Community preference, and that Community market organizations that had not yet 
been reformed such as the wine and fruit and vegetable sectors, would be particularly hard hit. 
Consequently, they argued, such an agreement would require more stringent production limits 
than those expected under CAP reform, which would have to be tightened up accordingly. 
The result was a lengthy, often arduous, highly technical debate between those who felt the terms of 
the Blair House Agreement were compatible overall with CAP reform and those who adamantly dee-
med them irreconcilable with CAP reform. Friends and foes made forecasts, calculated long-term 
incidences, and examined myriad hypotheses. Finally, the Council of  Minister's Special Agriculture 
Committee meeting convened in March 1993 concluded that the two would be compatible if  a certain 
number of assumptions made by the Commission were borne out, namely: 
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if the definition of aggregation for purposes of calculating market access that had been 
proposed by the Commission was adopted; 
if  cereals' harvests remained stable or increased by no more than 1% a year; 
if the use of Community grain in animal feeds increased by 12 million tonnes; 
if 15% of the Community's arable land was taken out of  production ('set aside') for the 
entire period; 
if the quotas in the milk sector were reduced by 2%; 
if  the safeguard clause in the sugar sector was applied without limitations, provided that the 
conditions for its application were met; 
for the application of  the peace clause, if  the level of support chosen in 1992 for granting 
aid, including in the sectors that had not yet been reformed, was respected; 
if meat other than red meat could be exported without export refunds; and 
if  a significant amount of  the Community's existing stocks could be disposed of  before the 
agreement went into effect. 
The Community would thus have to continue to negotiate firmly with the United States to get all 
the guarantees it required for a final agreement on tariffs and trade that would not be detrimental 
to European agriculture. 
In September 1993 the joint 'jumbo' Council ofEC Foreign and Agriculture Ministers asked the 
Commission to clarify - without reopening the entire Blair House package -certain points with 
the American negotiators with a view to wrapping up the GATT negotiations on agriculture. 
These  included  the  peace  clause,  the  safeguard  clause,  cereal  substitutes,  assessment  of 
commitments at the end of  the agreed period, aggregation, disposing of  stocks, and world market 
growth. In asking for these clarifications the jumbo Council also reasserted the CAP's founding 
principles, namely its permanent character, Community preference and the need to uphold the 
Community's role as an exporter. 
Following discussions between the EC Commissioner for Agriculture, Rene Steichen, and his 
American counterpart, Mike Espy, the Community made significant progress on all of these 
issues. (These breakthroughs are reflected in the results of  the Final Act, which are described in 
the next section.) The United States accepted, in particular, the extension of  the six-year term of 
the safeguard clause set out in the Blair House Agreement by another three years. In  addition, the 
principle of  the peace clause's continuation in the event of  an agreement to revise the new provi-
sions in the GATT Agreement on Agriculture was confirmed. It  is perhaps worthwhile remembe-
ring that the peace clause protects the Community from actions taken under the GATT that try to 
undermine the CAP's foundations. Such an achievement was thus a great victory, since it was the 
first time that the GATT recognized the CAP's mechanisms and granted them legal protection at 
the same time as indispensable international security. 
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At the end of this last round of negotiations with the United States the Commission felt that the 
overall result, which was clearly more favourable than the improvements over the  Dunkel 
compromise that had already been won in the Blair House Agreement, was  balanced and likely to 
satisfy the Community. What is more, it was compatible with CAP reform. 
The reform's basic assumptions as to a lowering of  production and greater reliance on domestic 
cereals were starting to be borne out. The EC's total cereals harvest in 1993 was less than 165 
million tonnes, that is, more than a million tonnes below that forecast when the reform was 
adopted. This figure should be compared with the 181  million tonnes harvested in 1991. The 
acreage under cereals was 32.7 millionha, also below the reform's targetof33.3 millionhaforthe 
first year. What is more, roughly an additional 5 million tonnes of  Community cereals would be 
incorporated into animal feed by the end of the year,  whilst Community imports of grain 
stabilized at around 3.5 million tonnes. 
In actual fact, the forecast figures that had been produced to try to pursuade everyone that the 
amount of  land set aside would have to be doubled as a result of  the GATT agriculture provisions 
were based on the expected failure of the reform and the equally mistaken assumption that the 
Commission would bow to US market access demands. But the opposite happened, since the 
Commission managed to consolidate Community preference and keep the reform on track. 
A  multilateral  agreement based on the  breakthroughs  achieved by  the  Commission in its 
discussions with the US will not require any additional efforts by European farmers beyond the 
reform's demands. 
7.  The Agreement 
After seven years of  thorny negotiations, the Uruguay Round ended in Geneva on 15 December 
1993 with an agreement involving 117 countries ( 113 of  the 114 signatories to the GATT and four 
observers, including China). This agreement, called the 'Final Act Embodying the Results of  the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations', was signed officially at the Ministerial 
Conference in Marrakesh on 15 April1994. It is to be implemented over a six-year  period starting 
no later than 1 July 1995. 
In this document we shall consider only the agricultural provisions of the Final Act, called the 
'Agreement on Agriculture'. This agreement contains some forty pages of  legal-that is, compli-
cated-text, including the appendices. We shall try to sum up its provisions according to the three 
main themes that have run through  the entire round. 
Q~W~IlitiiiiBBBB······································ 
22 CAP Working Notes -1995 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  ~~~0~ 
7 .1.  Domestic support 
Domestic support for agriculture, calculated in aggregate measurements of  support (see page 15) 
will drop by 20% compared with the 1986-88 reference period. The support granted under the 
reformed CAP is excluded from the total AMS (see point (b) below). Moreover, by lowering 
intervention prices for cereals and beef, the CAP has already brought the Community's total 
aggregate AMS below this reduction target (see Table 1 in the appendix). (There is a risk that 
intervention prices will rise due to an agrimonetary effect, but this risk has been lessened by the 
Council decision of  December 1993 making intervention price rises less dependent on changes in 
'green' currency rates.) 
Some types of  support (most direct payments) are not covered by reduction commitments. In the 
following list we have put them into either the 'green box' (aid that has no effect on trade or 
production and is  totally exempted from reductions) or the 'blue box' (aid linked to limiting 
production and thus exempted under certain conditions1). 
a)  Green box 
research, 
pest and disease control, 
training services, 
extension and advisory services, 
inspection services, 
marketing and promotion services, 
infrastructure services, 
public storage for security of food supply, 
domestic food aid, 
decoupled income support, that is, income support not tied to production and yields, 
income insurance and income safety-net programmes, 
natural disaster relief payments, 
cessation of activity, 
adaptation of agricultural structures, 
payments under environmental programmes, 
payments under regional assistance programmes (for less-favoured regions). 
The s~alled  "yellow box" consists of  price supports, that is, aid that has an effect on trade. That is 
the type of aid that is targeted by reduction commitments. (Some price supports are nevertheless 
exempted from reductions in the case of developing countries.) 
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b)  Blue box 
acreage- and fixed-yield-related aid, 
aid not exceeding 85% of the baseline production level, 
livestock aid granted for a fixed number of livestock units. 
The direct compensatory payments devised under CAP reform very clearly meet the 'blue box' 
criteria and are thus exempted from all commitments to reduce support under the GATT. If the 
reformed CAP aids comply with these criteria and do not, for a given product, exceed the support 
granted to this product during the 1992 marketing year, they will be protected from attack under 
GATT rules for nine years (the six-year implementation period that starts in 1995 plus three 
years). This is the famous 'peace clause' mentioned earlier (see pages 20 and 21). 
7  .2.  Export subsidies 
Export subsidies will be reduced by: 
21% by volume and 
36% ad valorem. 
These reductions must be effected over six years and will be calculated with regard to the 
1986-90  reference period. However, there is a certain amount of  leeway in choosing the reference 
period since, while the targeted 21% reduction by volume holds fast, 1991-92 may be used as the 
reference period if the mean level of subsidized exports over this period is higher than that of 
1986-90 (for beef, which reached exceptionally high export levels in 1991 and 1992, the baseline 
amount for calculating the reduction will be the mean for 1986-92). Choosing a more recent 
reference period allows one to make smaller reductions in exports at the start of a period. The 
advantages of such a 'frontloading' arrangement for the European Union are not negligible. It 
will  enable  the  European  Union  to  export  the  following  additional  amounts  over  the 
implementation period compared with the amounts that would have been authorized under the 
Blair House Agreement: 
wheat and wheat flour 
cheese 
other dairy products  1 
beef and veal 
poultry 
eggs 
tobacco 
8,116,000 tonnes 
102,000 tonnes 
44,000 tonnes 
362,000 tonnes 
253,000 tonnes 
16,000 tonnes 
156,000 tonnes 
Except for butter and skimmed milk powder. 
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The Commission managed to get exports of Spanish and Portuguese wines included in the 
1986-90 base period calculation, thereby increasing the Community's authorized subsidized 
wine exports over six years by 4.4 million hl above the Blair House figure. 
It should be noted that the additional volumes of  wheat and wheat flour amount to one third of  the 
Community's current cereal stocks. In the case of  beef  and veal, the increase amounts to close to 
65% of current stocks. 
A similar system will apply to budget outlays with regard to the choice of  the reference period and 
level of commitment at the end of the implementation period, the ultimate goal being to reduce 
budgetary outlays for export subsidization by 36% (taking the 1986-90 period as the reference). 
The following points also deserve to be highlighted: 
a)  The reductions will be made in a linear fashion, i.e., line by line by year and by product 
category. This means that the reductions will be made: 
year by year, albeit benefiting from an annual tolerance of 1.75% in terms of  volume and 
3% ad valorem over the target level; however, the cumulative commitments over the years 
must be kept; and 
category by category, agricultural exports being divided into twenty categories, so that 
reductions will concern butter, skimmed milk powder, cheese and other dairy products 
separately rather than all dairy products as a whole (see Table 2 in the appendix); 
b)  processed products will escape the obligation of reduction in budget terms only; 
c)  developing countries are committed to reducing subsidized exports by 14% in terms of 
volume and 24% in terms of  budget outlays, instead of21% and 36%, respectively, for all 
other countries; 
d)  food aid is exonerated from subsidized-export reduction commitments, provided that it is 
not linked to commercial exports; 
e)  current stocks must be disposed of  on the world market before the Final Act goes into force. 
After that, their release onto the market will be considered subsidized exporting and thus 
subject to the terms of the Final Act; and 
f)  unsubsidized exports are not concerned by the Final Act. 
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The commitments to reduce subsidized exports apply to the following types of  export subsidization: 
direct subsidies (including payments in kind) paid to a company, branch of  production, 
producers of agricultural products, an association of such producers or a sales office and 
that are contingent on export results; 
exporting of  non-commercial stocks at prices  below  domestic market  prices (dumping); 
export subsidization of  a product that is financed by a levy on the product or  its derivatives; 
product subsidies that are contingent on the products being incorporated into exported products; 
subsidies designed to reduce the marketing costs of exports; and, 
domestic transport and freight rates for shipping goods for export that are more favourable 
than the terms applied to domestic market shipments. 
During the implementation period developing countries are not bound to reduce the last two types 
of subsidies. 
7.3.  Market access 
We have already seen that the key to market access is the tariff  system. Just as a reminder, tariffica-
tion (one of  the basic principles of  the GATT) consists of  converting all mechanisms of  protection 
at the border into fixed tariffs (customs duties). For European farmers this means that the current 
system of  variable duties and charges will be replaced by a tariff system. Up until now, the combi-
nation of import levies and export refunds has been the lynchpin of  the Community preference 
system, which itself  is one of  the pillars of  the Common Agricultural Policy (see the boxed text on 
page 10). Thus, the market liberalization aimed at by the GATT means that the entire philosophy 
of Community preference must be rethought.1 In other words, the European Union had vital 
interests at stake and had to fight determinedly throughout the Uruguay Round. 
This determination paid off and, as we shall see, the European Union, far from abandoning the 
principle of  Community preference, has simply adapted it to the new rules of  international trade 
and can feel satisfied about the Agreement on Agriculture overall. 
The GAIT's market access rules consist of various elements that we shall examine one by one 
below. 
The levy on non-EC imports was paid by the importer and was equal to the difference bet ween the 
entry price at  the border (threshold or  reference price, which was set annually) and the world market 
price for the product. It  was said to be 'variable' because it rose when the world market price fell and 
decreased when the world market price rose. 
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a)  Tariffication 
All measures of  protection at the border will be turned into fixed customs duties called 'tariff 
equivalents'. These tariff equivalents will be reduced by 36% over six years (24% over ten 
years for the developing countries). This rate of reduction is the mathematical mean for the 
entire set of  tariff  equivalents; the product-specific reductions will vary, with the minimum 
set at 15% (see Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix). The reference period is 1986-88. 
For  the European Union, the tariff  equivalents for 1995 correspond to the difference between 
the mean  entry prices at the border and mean world market prices in 1986-88. We thus see that 
the only difference with regard to the variable levies is that the tariff equivalents are fixed. 
This is where the safeguard clause comes into play (see the graph in the appendix). 
b)  Safeguard clause 
The safeguard clause (see Chapter I, Point 7) may be applied if  the import volume exceeds a 
specific threshold level or import prices fall below a certain level. In each case, which will be 
described below, additional duties may be applied. 
Rise in the volume of  imports: 
The threshold that triggers application of the safeguard clause is: 
125% of  the mean volume of  imports (  1986-88) when a product's market access possibilities  1 
are less than or equal to 10%; 
110% of the mean volume of  imports (  1986-88) when a product's market access possibilities 
are greater than 10% but less than or equal to 30%; and 
105% of the mean volume of  imports (1986-88) when a product's market access possibilities 
are greater than 30%. 
Any additional duty will be maintained only until the end of the year in question and may not 
exceed one-third of the customs duty normally applied. 
Defined as the volume of imports as a percentage of domestic consumption over the previous three 
years. 
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Falling import prices: 
The safeguard clause may be applied if  the import price drops below the trigger price, that is, the 
mean reference price for 1986-88. In this case, an additional duty may be applied as follows: 
if  the difference between the import price and the trigger price is less than or equal to 10% of 
the trigger price, no additional duty will be applied; 
if  this difference is greater than 10% but less than or equal to 40%, the additional duty will 
be equal to 30% of the portion above the 10% cutoff; 
if  the difference is greater than 40% but less than or equal to 60%, the additional duty will be 
50% of the portion above the 40% cutoff plus the duty authorized in the preceding indent; 
if  the difference is greater than 60% but less than or equal to 7 5%, the additional duty will be 
70% of the portion above the 60% cutoff plus the duties authorized in the two preceding 
indents; 
if the difference is greater than 75%, the additional duty will be 90% of the portion above 
the 75% cutoff plus the duties authorized in the three preceding indents. 
The case of  cereals is special in that the difference between the import price and intervention 
price may not exceed 55% of the intervention price. As the tariff equivalents in the cereals 
sector are sufficiently high and intervention prices have been sufficiently reduced by CAP 
reform, the differential remains great. In this way Community preference is preserved. 
c)  Minimum access 
With a view to greater opening of markets, the agreement provides that each signatory country 
must open up market shares for third countries. The market shares made available for imports in 
this manner will be 3% of reference period consumption for each group of products (reference 
period =  1986-88). This figure will be raised to 5% by the end of the six-year implementation 
period. 
This is not an obligation to import, but the granting of a reduced customs duty- 32% of  the 
basic duty, which is itself subject to reduction (see point a)  above) - for this quantity of 
imports. It  should be added that the minimum access does not apply to the sectors that are not 
subject to tariffication, such as fruit and vegetables and wine in the case of the European 
Union. 
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In the case of  minimum access, like the case of  export subsidization, the US (followed by most 
of the other negotiating parties) finally acceded to the Community's insistent demand with 
regard to aggregation, i.e., considering groups of  products rather than isolated products (see 
Table 5 in the appendix). 
d)  Current access 
The import tariff concessions granted before the agreement's entry into force must be maintained 
at least at their 1986--88 levels. 
e)  Rebalancing the market 
The consultation clause that applies if Community imports of cereal substitutes rise has been 
improved. Such consultations will take place with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solu-
tion if the level of cereal substitute imports rises above the 1990-92 mean. 
* 
Agriculture was definitely the trickiest area of  negotiation for the European Union throughout the 
Uruguay Round. The outcome is nevertheless satisfactory, as the Union has achieved two of  its 
main objectives, namely: 
a better balance of  supply and demand on the world agricultural commodities markets; and 
compatibility of the GATT rules with the EU's reformed CAP structures. 
The results of the Uruguay Round give the European Union enough room for manoeuvre to 
manage its own internal policies. Its market access commitments do not infringe on the principle 
of  Community preference and new possibilities have been opened up to European exporters. Its 
export commitments are compatible with the 1992 CAP reform, whilst the peace clause puts the 
European Union out of  danger of  any attacks that non-EU countries may make on its agricultural 
policy. 
So, an important result of  the Uruguay Round is that, for the first time, the principle mechanisms 
of the CAP are safe from bilateral attack and if concessions are withdrawn, this will be done in 
accordance with multilateral rules. 
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IV.  The World Trade Organization 
The Final Act that was signed in Marrakesh also includes an 'Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organization'. This World Trade Organization (WTO) is supposed to replace GATT and 
strengthen the institutional framework that presides over world economic relations. The WTO's 
creation is  testimony  that the  European  Union  and  the  Organization's  other members  are 
committed to having a multilateral trade system that is both more open and more regulated. The 
aim is to get its members to settle their trade differences multilaterally within the WTO rather than 
bilaterally, or even unilaterally. 
The WTO will provide a single institutional framework encompassing the GATT,  all of the 
agreements reached under its auspices and the complete results of  the Uruguay Round, including 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and, obviously, the Agreement on Agriculture. It  will be 
headed by a Ministerial Conference that must meet at least once every two years.lts members will 
have to abide by the results of the Uruguay Round in accordance with the principle of  the single 
package ('all or nothing'). 
The agreement establishing the WTO also contains a binding provision whereby its members 
must align their national legislation with the agreements that constitute the WTO's structural 
components. This also limits the possibilities of unilateral action. 
The result is an institutional framework that will guarantee that the dismantling of  trade barriers 
will be followed by real, lasting market access. 
This agreement also enhances the world trade system's status, enabling the WTO to co-operate 
with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The result will be a more consistent 
approach to international economic policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The signing of  the 'Final Act Embodying the Results of  the Uruguay Round' by the participants in 
the Ministerial Conference in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 formally marks the end of the most 
ambitious undertaking of liberalization in the history of world trade. The 2643-day Uruguay 
Round came to a close with agreement over reducing customs duties, opening up markets and 
extending international rules to new areas of  cross-border economic activity. As in the case of  the 
earlier GATT rounds, the European Union was a key player. 
GATT and OECD experts calculate that eliminating trade restrictions will cause a surge in world 
trade worth ECU 240 billion. According to the European Commissioner responsible for External 
Economic Relations, Sir  Leon Brittan, the overall impact of  this move will be considerable. There 
is no question that any improvement in world trading conditions will have a major effect on the 
European Union's economy, given that the European Union is now the world's leading trading 
partner. 
The European Union accounts for 20% of world exports of goods and 30% of world exports of 
services. Exports of goods and services account for about 25% of the European Union's gross 
domestic product (GDP). According to Sir Leon, the European Union can expect a one-time 
boost in GDP as a result of  the Uruguay Round's achievements of  the order ofECU 65 billion that 
should lead directly to the creation of  several hundred thousand jobs across the European Union. 
Sir Leon listed six major achievements of the Uruguay Round, namely: 
1)  establishment of the primacy of the open market; 
2)  reinforcement of the multilateral rules and procedures for dispute settlement; 
3)  the inclusion of new economic sectors, such as services, in world trade; 
4)  the creation of  a new body, the World Trade Organization, to take over from the GAIT and 
take on a stronger international trade monitoring role; 
5)  the reaching of  a consensus in favour of  major reductions in the import duties on industrial 
goods, which should be cut some 40% on average (37% in the case of  the European Union); 
and, 
6)  a system of  international agricultural trade that is both more responsive to the laws of 
supply and demand and compatible with the European Union's Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
All the participants in the Marrakesh Ministerial Conference agree that we have crossed the 
threshold of a new era in international trade co-operation. 
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APPENDIX 
Tables of European Union commitments 
Table 1 
Aggregate measurements of support for the main sectors 
(in million ECU) 
.  ·=~·.······~~·········.·~·······~~ 
.  (a)· •  ·  ..  / (a-·20% ~b)  •. 
Total AMS cereals  . 3t~6ll  · .  23~r  .:  25,526.  ·  11,101 
Total AMS livestock  27 266··  ..  . , 
Total AMS other products  . 20,422 
I  Total AMS all products  I  79,299] 
Source: CEC 
1,263 
152. 
1,6521 
..  23,076 
·16,490 
65;091  1 
19,698 
20,422 
51,2211 
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Table 2 
Reductions in subsidized exports<l) 
.,  '' 
·••·  '~e~~?Ji<-;:·_-:·  SubSidiZed Exports -
... :.·_  :.19,91~~;·•.(, 
1991-92  1995"  2000:  ···:%(~).-_ 
.. 
_;  ,•: 
.. 
- -- ..  '~ 
Wheat and flour  20,255  19~118  13;436.- .- -34~:':..: 
Feed grains  12.199  12tl83_  9~973.  -18~i:: 
Rice  173  177  145  -16%·-
Rapeseed  - 97  79 
-·~ 
Olive oil  112  143  117 
..  -"""""'',_ 
"  .. 
Sugar  1~299  1~560  1,277"  ...-Z%' 
Raw tobacco  205  190  128- -38%-
Fresh fruit and vegetables  1,039  1,108  907  -13%. 
Processed fruit and vegetables  190  194  166  -13%:· 
Wine  2,954  2,980  2,433  -:·18%· 
Alcohol  1,185  1,407  1,147  -3%._ 
Skimmed milk powder  254  297  243  -4%--. 
Butter and butteroil  273  447  366  ...,..; 
Cheese  427  407  305  -29%.:-
Other milk products  1,208  1,161  938  -22% 
Beef and veal  1,324  1,119  817  - 3go/(,,, 
Pigmeat  490  491  402  -18%. 
Poultrymeat  470  440  291  -38%-: 
Eggs  112  107  83  -26% 
Processed products  No reductions in volume but reductions in budget outlays  __ -
Source: CEC 
(1)  Figures are in thousand tonnes with the exception of wine and alcohol where they are in 
thousand hectolitres. 
(2)  1986-90/2000 =-21%. 
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Table 3 
Tariff reductions 
',  .-.-.  '  ''''  .  ' 
· ·  .. · ·  Pfi)(lucts ·  · 
::~$~~.-:l~~~~l::~~l,p.  ~live-()il, wint-~tito~co ..  ·. 
-·~~~·;:~i)k;::.fio~tter·· 
:p~~e:~~  .·£oods.c0ntaining·.sugar or  sldmm~  .·milk powder · 
:Asparagus, .grapes and apples  . 
Oth~r  fruit·:and \Tegetables 
Potatoes ·. 
Tu,rkey.  · ... ·· 
.  . 
Beef liver and ·pork liver 
All: productS subject to a maximum tariff of  4% (except fruit and 
:vegetables) 
',,'  .  .-. 
·other products 
6-year reclucti()n::<;otnpared 
withi9S~:19SR  reference  · 
~nod 
- .20% 
- 20% 
- 20% 
-. 36% 
- 20% 
- 20% 
-·so% 
-100% 
- 100% 
- 36% 
Source: National Farmers' Union (NFU Briefing Intemationall/94). 
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Table 4 
Basic tariffs for some agricultural products (slated for a 36% decrease over 6 years) 
Products 
Live animals 
Bovine carcasses, fresh and frozen 
- Fore quarters 
-Hind quarters 
Pig carcasses 
Sheep carcasses:  - fresh or chilled 
-frozen 
Live poultry 
Fresh chickens:  - 83% 
-70% 
-65% 
Butter:  - less than 85% fat 
- other grades 
Cheddar cheese 
Sweet potatoes and manioc (cassava) 
Wheat 
Barley 
Wheat flour 
..  ·  ··  •·.  Basic· tati«s in·%:  ·>·  ·· 
·  +  ECU/tCinne ·. 
16+1,454. 
20+2,763 
. 20+ 2,210  . 
20+ 3,454 
838 ECU/tonne 
20+2,677 
20+ 2;013 
0  .. 081 ECU/bird 
410 ECU/tonne 
467 ECU/tonne 
508 ECU/tonne 
2;692 ECU/tonne 
3,614 ECU/tonne 
2,611 ECU/tonne 
6 + 148 ECU/tonne 
149 ECU/tonne 
145 ECU/tonne 
268 ECU/tonne 
Source: National Farmers' Union (NFU Briefing International 1194) . 
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'  .  .  '  .  . 
TransformatiOn ofthe custmDs1Betbanisms ~  . 
CAP1995 
( etfect of GATT  ) 
Frontier entry price ( variable } 
agiicultural.prodUcts  · 
CAP.1994. 
frontier threshold price( fixed) 
world price ( variable ) 
:levy (variable) 
CAP2000 
( etrectofGATT+36%·drop. 
in tariff equivalents ) 
Frontier entry price ( variable ) 
~6% 
Tariff equivalent  ·~ 
(fixed)  I  Tariff equivalent 
(fixed) 
World price ( variable ) 
Frontier entry price ( variable ) 
Tariff equivalent 
(fixed) 
I 
World price ( variable ) 
World price ( variable ) 
Effect of  the safe  uard clause 
Safeguard clause: 
Partial additional duties (crosshatched 
area) trigger¢d when (variable) c.i.f. 
world price drops below fixed reference 
world price, 
Reference world price ( fixed ) 
Source: APCA (supplement to No818 or'Chambres d'  Agriculture', January 1994 ). 
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Table 5 
Market access commitments 
1·. ·  ... 
·Wheat·· 
'  '  :  .'.  : ...  ·  . 
:Maim  •. s{)~ghuxrt······ 
Brans. 
Sugar (cane or beet) 
·Mushrooms 
··.Products.··· 
Sweet potat<>es and manioc . 
Bananas 
Citrus fruits· 
Cheeses 
Butter 
Skimmed milk powder 
Live cattle·. 
Beef and veal 
Pigmeat 
J 
Live sheep ·and goats, sheep-and goatmeat 
Poultry 
~ggs. 
Source: CEC 
.  _.·  :;;,...,_'. 
'  -~  - -- ' 
2·~oo·ooo .·  '  .  ,  . 
.  . 
:415~000· ... 
1,565,000 
62,660 
6,857,390 
2,000,000 
45,000 
15,250 
76~667 
194,000 head 
151,050 
319,875 
( tonnes) 
... :  ••  •::~~~00();•'(~1:~ 
·.·. SOO~OO~l{~.j}i:. 
.. ·  ... 
--.-:  .. :  .... : 
.  104,000(2)' 
10,000'(2) 
69,000(2) 
20,000(2). 
75,600 (2) 
. 29,000 (2) 
208,000(2) 
(1)  Quota applicable as of the start of the implementation period under the oilseeds agreement. 
(2)  Quota applicable at the end of the implementation period. 
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